Does Indeterminism Give Rise to an Intrinsic Time Arrow? by Dolev, S et al.
Does Indeterminism Give Rise to an Intrinsic
Time Arrow?
∗
Shahar Doleva†, Avshalom C. Elitzura‡, Meir Hemmob§
February 1, 2001
aUnit of Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 52900, Israel.
bPhilosophy Department, Haifa University, Haifa 31905 Israel.
Abstract
In any physical theory that admits true indeterminism, the thermo-
dynamic arrow of time can arise regardless of the system’s initial con-
ditions. Hence on such theories time’s arrow emerges out of the basic
physical interactions. The example of the GRW theory is studied in
detail.
1 Introduction
Our experience suggests that the universe’s evolution is invariably time-
asymmetric, that is, that events evolve one after another from past to future.





If this intuition is correct, then time’s apparent arrow should be intrinsic
to the fundamental dynamical laws describing our universe. However, this
intuitive impression is contradicted by current physical theories, according to
which the fundamental dynamical laws of the universe are without exception
time symmetric, i.e., invariant under time reversal.
In view of this time symmetry of physical laws, most accounts in the
foundations of physics appeal to statistical assumptions concerning certain
special boundary conditions in order to account for the apparent arrow of
time. There are, however a few attempts (see e. g. Penrose [15]) to account
for this arrow of time by making an appeal to a new physics which would ex-
plicitly include within the dynamical equations of motion a time-asymmetric
component.
Another unresolved question in the foundations of physics is whether de-
terminism holds at the microscopic level. Here opinions are more evenly
divided. In quantum mechanics, for instance, some interpretations postu-
late dynamical equations of motion that are completely deterministic (e. g.
Bohm’s pilot-wave [17] and Everett’s many worlds interpretation [18]), whereas
other interpretations, following early ideas of von Neumann [1] and Dirac [2],
attempt to rewrite the fundamental quantum mechanical laws by proposing
indeterministic equations of motion (e. g. the collapse theory of Ghirardi, Ri-
mini, and Weber (GRW) [22] and Penrose’s [4] hypothesis of gravitational
collapse). Genuine stochastic dynamics has also been invoked in other fields
of physics, e. g. black-hole thermodynamics (Hawking and Penrose [20]) and
general relativity (Earman [19]).
These two questions, that is, the questions of whether the fundamen-
tal dynamical laws contain an (as yet unknown) intrinsic time arrow, and
whether or not they are genuinely deterministic, went on nearly oblivious
to one another. In this paper we would like to study their bearings on one
another in detail.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss three
types of uncertainty and their physical manifestations. In section 3 we show
the fundamental affinity between indeterminism and entropy. In section 4 we
briefly review the GRW theory, then in section 5 we review Albert’s method
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of deriving the thermodynamic arrow from quantum collapse. Finally, we
discuss the broader connection between the stochastic dynamics and the
arrow of time.
2 Three Uncertainties and their Physical Man-
ifestations
Let us begin with some theoretical considerations of uncertainty, reversibility,
and determinism. We will use the term “uncertainty” to denote the strong,
ontological sense of the term. In other words, we do not refer to the observer’s
mere ignorance but to the real absence of any strict cause-effect relations
between two event. We make use of the notion of causation here in an
intuitive way without appealing to any specific theory of causation. An
operational definition for such uncertainty is as follows:
If event A is uncertain and event B is its cause (effect), then, repeating
the process in the forward (backward) time direction will not always reproduce
A from B.
Such an uncertainty can take one out of three forms, which we shall denote
by “V,” “Λ,” and “X,” according to these letters’ shapes (as in Fig. 1).
Strict determinism will be represented by I, since it has a linear topology:
each initial event C constitutes a cause for only one effect E. Indeterministic
theories can have one of the following topologies :“V uncertainty” arises when
a certain cause C can give rise to more than one possible effect: E1, E2, ... .
“Λ uncertainty” is the inverse case where a system can start at any one out
of some initial states, C1, C2, ..., but always reaches one final state E. “X
uncertainty” is a combination of the former two: an event can have several
initial causes, C1, C2, ..., as well as several effects, E1, E2, ... .
Note the following:
• Only Λ and V topologies are asymmetric under time reversal, and as
such have a “built-in” microscopic time arrow. This microscopic time
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Figure 1: Possible topologies for physical dynamics.
arrow may, or may not, manifest itself at the macro level, for instance
in the form of a thermodynamic arrow (in accordance with the second
law of thermodynamics). However, any further discussion on the arrow
of time becomes superfluous, since its origin is apparent.
• V uncertainty is what we call “indeterminism”, since the present state
of the system cannot help predicting its future state. However, such a
topology is reversible since reversing the system from any of the effects
E1, E2, ..., will always yield the initial cause C.
• Λ uncertainty, on the other hand, is deterministic in the forward time
direction, but irreversible (in the sense just defined).
• All but X uncertainty are not accessible to empirical investigation.
In I topology, for example, a system can be prepared in such a way
as to either increase or decrease its entropy, depending only on the
initial state. Hence, as Hawking [21] pointed out, we might be living
in a universe that actually evolves from what we call “future” to our
“past”, and we wouldn’t notice, as our perceptual mechanisms would
be reversed accordingly. Similarly, since V and Λ uncertainties are
mirror images of one another, we could be living in a world having one
topology which nevertheless evolves from “past” to “future” (in some
absolute sense), or vice versa. Neither experience nor experiment can
distinguish between these possibilities.
• Hence, only X is a testable hypothesis, which we shall study in what
follows.
Returning to physics, it is quantum mechanics where one would look for
examples for such uncertainties. We would like to state that uncertainty
in physics always comes in the X topology. For that purpose, consider the
experimental setup in Fig. 2a. Here an electron source emits electrons in an
4
[scale=0.6]exp.eps
Figure 2: How to view physical indeterminism.
x-spin up (x+) state. These electrons pass through a Stern-Gerlach (S.G.)
magnet that splits their path according to their z-spin. Then the electrons
can hit, with a 50-50 probability, one of the two detectors: A for z+, or B
for z−.
In a world of indeterministic dynamics (such as von Neumann’s “col-
lapse”, or GRW1) one would intuitively classify its topology to be V, such
as in Fig. 1b: here one initial state C (the electron at spin x+), gave rise to
one out of two effects: E1 (the electron hitting A with spin z+), and E2 (the
electron hitting B with spin z−). However, V topology must be strictly re-
versible, and this is not the case here: reversing the operation of the detector
that has clicked will cause the electron to reach the source in either a z+ or
a z− state, in contrast to state C where a spin x+ electron was emitted.
In order to resolve this inconsistency, let us look at Fig. 2b. Here the
apparatus is extended to the past to explain how one could make an x+
spin source: one has actually used a generic electron source and passed the
output beam through an X-S.G. Only the x+ part was allowed to continue
the experiment. Now, reversing the experiment will, in 50% of the cases,
return an x+ electron to the source S.
However, there is another possible past for the system. The electron could
have been emitted in a X− spin state from source P , and reach exactly the
same probabilities for the final states E1, and E2. This additional possible
past now completes the picture, since reversing from these final states might
cause the electron to be deflected down at the x-S.G. and reach source P .
Now we can see that in an indeterministic theory the dynamics can be
1What we say in what follows applies only to the discrete model of the GRW theory. In
the continuous model the dynamics turns out also to be time irreversible, but for different
reasons related to the behavior of the tails of the collapsed wavefunction (see footnote 5
for more details).
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time reversed in the above sense provided there are two possible pasts - that
is, an X topology. Note, however, that the X might not be completely time-
symmetric, that is C1, and C2 need not be equal to E1, and E2.
Note further that in the case of collapse interpretations of quantum me-
chanics such as the GRW theory (and von Neumann’s theory) the X shape
situation means that the statistical results of measurements that may be car-
ried out on a system at a given time (that is, of measurements of commuting
observables) are in principle insufficient in order to built up, by retrodiction,
the initial wavefunction of the system.2 Of course, in quantum mechanics
without collapse it is also true that the actual statistics of results is insuffi-
cient to retrodict with certainty the wavefunction, but in such theories it is
also true that the overall state of the world after a measurement is described
by the uncollapsed wavefunction which obeys a completely deterministic and
time reversible dynamics (i. e. the Schro¨dinger equation).
Next we shall consider the bearing of these conclusions on the origins of
the thermodynamic arrow of time.
3 When Determinism Fails
In most physical discussions, “irreversibility” is used in the technical, hence
relative sense. Processes like milk being spilt or a match being burnt are
irreversible only in the practical sense because, in principle, a sufficiently
advanced technology can reverse them. Indeed some processes considered
irreversible by past standards are becoming reversible today.
Notice, however, that when referring to “sufficiently advanced technol-
ogy,” one has in mind a kind of nanotechnology that can reverse, precisely and
simultaneously, the motions of a myriad of molecules, so as to get spilt milk
gathered anew in the jar and a match re-assembled from charcoal, smoke, and
thermal photons. Now, this sense of reversibility rests on a highly non-trivial
assumption that must no more be left tacit. To say that a process can be
2One can, however, built up the wavefunction from the (counterfactual) statistical
results of all possible measurements which would include non-commuting measurements.
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Figure 3a: A computer simulation of an entropy increasing process, with the
initial and final states (right) and the entire process using a spacetime dia-
gram (left). One billiard ball hits a group of ordered balls at rest, dispersing
them all over the table. After repeated collisions between the balls, the en-
ergy and momentum of the first ball is nearly equally divided between the
balls.
[scale=0.75]fig1b.eps
Figure 3b: The time-reversed process. All the momenta of the balls are
reversed at t=350. Eventually, the initial ordered group is re-formed, as at
t=0, ejecting back the first ball.
microscopically reversed, one must profess absolute determinism. It is only
strict determinism that guarantees that, once the momenta of all molecules
of a system are reversed, the system will return to its initial state.
Fig. 3 gives a simple illustration for this principle. A set of Newtonian
balls (hence, harboring an I topology) is simulated in the forward and back-
ward time directions at absolute precision. In Fig. 4, an event of X inde-
terminism is inserted by a single random interference with the position of a
single ball. It is common knowledge that, for a normal system whose entropy
increases, a slight interference will make no difference for the overall entropy
increase. The final macrostate affected by the interference will be indistin-
guishable from the final state that would ensue otherwise. In contrast, an
entropy decreasing system is extremely sensitive to interference: It requires a
[scale=0.8]fig2a.eps
Figure 4a: The same simulation as in 3a, with a slight disturbance in the
trajectory of one ball (marked by the small circle). Entropy increase seems
to be indistinguishable from that of 3a.
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Figure 4b: The same computer simulation as in 3b, with a similar distur-
bance. Here, the return to the ordered initial state fails.
very special microstate at any instant, and the slightest interference will ruin
its entropy decrease. Hence, the system will fail to converge to the desired
ordered state.
What makes this seemingly trivial observation crucial in the context of
time’s arrow is this: Regardless of the system’s initial conditions, its en-
tropy always increases following the random event. If these initial conditions
are of the normal, entropy-increasing type, the random event would merely
strengthen entropy increase. If, on the other hand, they are of the unique,
entropy-decreasing type, the random event would most probably flip the sys-
tem’s evolution back towards entropy increase. Hence, genuine indetermin-
ism at the micro scale enforces a macroscopic time arrow that has nothing
to do with initial condition. Rather, it seems to be intrinsic (see also Elitzur
and Dolev [12, 13, 14]).
A similar conclusion has been reached by Albert [9, 10], who studied
the indeterminism entailed by the GRW theory. We shall review the GRW
interpretation in the following section, and Albert’s arguments afterwards.
4 The GRW theory
The GRW theory [22] is an interpretation of QM in which the von Neumann
collapse is built into the dynamics of the wavefunction itself. There is no
talk about measurement, observation, decoherence, or anything like that,
and there is no need for thumb rules that somehow distinguish between the
classical and the quantum levels, or system and its environment. According
to GRW, any system whatsoever has a quantum state, and that state evolves
under a single dynamical equation of motion. Quantum mechanics can be
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applied to any system whatsoever, including the universe as a whole. How-
ever, the theory explains, as a straightforward result of the dynamics, why
systems consisting of a large number of particles (i. e. macroscopic systems)
do not usually exhibit quantum interference (Schro¨dinger cats and measuring
devices included). The theory in its most simple (and nonrelativistic) form
goes as follows.3
Consider the quantum wavefunction of a composite system consisting of
N particles:
|Ψ(x1...xN , t)〉. (1)
The time evolution of the wavefunction usually but not always satisfies the
linear and deterministic Schro¨dinger equation. From time to time the wave-





where xk is randomly chosen from the arguments in (1) and the width ∆ of
the Gaussian is stipulated to be approximately ∆ = 10−5cm. This parameter
is taken as a new constant of nature. The GRW jumps are also stipulated to
occur only in position, and this means that on this theory, wavefunctions that
are approximate eigenstates of position are taken to be physically preferred.
Two additional questions with respect to the GRW collapses need to
be settled: first, When do they occur? and second, Where? According to
GRW, the answers to both questions are a matter of probability. Concerning
the first, the probability τ for a collapse for a single particle at any given
time is stipulated to be approximately τ = 10−15 (again a new constant of
nature). Concerning the second question, the probability that the reduced
wavefunction will be centered around any spatial point x at time t is given




where G(x, k) is the GRW Gaussian defined in (2).
This is essentially the whole theory. However, three brief comments are
in order:
3Here we follow Bell’s discrete model [3].
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(1) The choice of the new constants of nature, i. e. the frequency of the
collapses τ (which is proportional to the number of particles) and the width
of the Gaussian ∆ ensure that the collapses will not result in violations of
either our experience on the macroscopic scale, or of the well confirmed pre-
dictions of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, the stochastic dynamics
is designed in such a way that the solution to the measurement problem in
the quantum theory of measurement, obtains a straightforward result of the
quantum mechanics of composite systems. In other words, any interaction
which involves the spatial displacement of a large number of particles (say,
in the pointer, or in records imprinted on a paper) will, with overwhelming
probability, result in a collapse of the wavefunction onto one of the eigenstates
of the pointer’s position with the usual Born probabilities.
(2) It follows from the GRW prescription that the collapses of the wave-
function might induce violations of both momentum and energy conserva-
tion. The GRW collapses will sometimes give rise to increase in momentum,
in which case electrons might jump out of their orbits in the atoms. Similarly,
they might increase the energy of a given cloud of gas just enough to heat it
up, whereas we know experimentally that such things do not occur. However,
∆ is chosen here to be wide enough so that the violations of the conservation
laws will be small enough so as to be unobserved. So (in principle) it seems
as if in the GRW theory there is a trade off between getting the second law
of thermodynamics right, by the price of making the first law approximate.
Note that if the GRW collapses were to occur onto delta functions in position,
the violations of the conservation laws would be observable.
(3) ∆ is chosen to be narrow enough so that the GRW collapses map the
wavefunctions onto states that are close (in Hilbert space norm) to eigenstates
of position, so that the positions become only approximately definite. This
means that the GRW hits do not set the systems onto definite position states,
but rather onto superpositions of positions with nonzero tails.4 But the
amplitudes of these tails are small enough, so that the superposition has no
observable effects, and the particles behave as if they actually have definite
4This yields the so-called tails problem: see Albert [11]. Also, when and where the
hits occur in measurement situations might drastically vary. For some measurements it
turns out that the GRW collapses are unlikely to occur prior to the interaction with the
observer: see Albert and Vaidman [8].
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positions. Moreover, it turns out that these tails play an important role in
the attempts to write down a relativistic version of the GRW theory.5
5 Albert’s Derivation of Entropy Increase from
Quantum Collapse
According to Albert [9, 10], the GRW theory provides a good candidate for
reducing thermodynamics to mechanics, because its basic dynamical laws
are fundamentally and irreducibly indeterministic. Moreover, the genuine
stochastic collapse in the GRW theory is supposed to occur at the microscopic
level with a frequency that suffices to actually derive the second law from
the GRW dynamics.
Albert argues that a fundamental thermodynamic arrow intrinsic to the
dynamics can be derived only in the GRW theory and not in other interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics, such as Bohm’s theory, modal interpretations
and the many worlds interpretations, since the latter are all deterministic and
time reversible theories (I topology). Following Albert, we argue that a gen-
uine indeterministic dynamics is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition
for deriving a fundamental arrow of time, including the thermodynamic ar-
row. That is, such a derivation can be carried only in theories which employ
genuine stochastic equations of motion. By an intrinsic arrow of time we
mean that the arrow of time should be solely a consequence of the dynamical
equations of motion of the theory, and in particular it should be independent
5 In the case of the continuous, relativistic, model of the GRW theory the time reversed
evolution in standard quantum mechanics (with no collapse) and in the GRW theory
coincide. That is, on this model the almost zero tail of the ”down” wavepacket will
grow as the wavefunction is evolved backwards in time, so that the reversed wavepackets
will exhibit the standard Schro¨dinger re-interference. This is by contrast to the almost
negligible effect of the tail of the wavefunction in the course of the forward time evolution.
In this sense also the continuous model of the GRW theory is not time reversible, though
for a different reason. Note that the time irreversibility of the GRW tails turns out to be
crucial in the case of relativistic versions of the theory. See Pearle [6]. Given this behavior
of the continuous model, it is interesting to consider whether or not it remains genuinely
stochastic.
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of initial (or final) conditions.
Here is one way to see how Albert’s reduction of the thermodynamic laws
to the GRW theory is carried out. Consider, for instance, the special case of
the approach to equilibrium of thermodynamic systems. Take N molecules
of some gas that is spreading out in a container. In standard (Schro¨dinger)
quantum mechanics the composite wavefunction of the gas will almost always
correspond to a state in which (due to quantum mechanical interactions) the
molecules will be entangled with each other (and with the container walls),
and moreover they will generally not be located in some definite positions
within the container.
However, because of the high value of N, the N -particles wavefunction
in the GRW theory has an overwhelming probability for collapses at almost
every instant of time. Moreover, according to the GRW prescription the
wavefunction is reduced after a collapse to a Gaussian that is localized around
some spatial distribution of the gas molecules. This means in particular that
the solutions of the GRW equations of motion for the times at which collapses
occur are approximately product states in position, where the molecules have
in fact definite positions.
Finally note that this behavior critically depends on two factors. First,
the number of particles in the system needs to be large enough to ensure
the high probability for a GRW collapse. Second, the time evolution needs
to be such that the wavefunction evolves into a superposition of terms cor-
responding to spatial locations of the molecules which differ more than the
width ∆ of the GRW Gaussian. If these conditions hold, the GRW jumps
will invariably change the wavefunction of the gas in a way that is enough
to put each molecule of the gas onto an apparently well defined trajectory.
In particular, this behavior of the wavefunction is completely independent of
initial conditions.
Recall now how mainstream physics tackles Loschmidt’s paradox. Ac-
cording to Loschmidt, by the same statistical considerations that have lead
Boltzmann to predict entropy growth in the future direction, entropy should
grow in the past direction too, as statistics itself is indifferent to the time
directions. Against this paradox physicists invoke the low entropy past pos-
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tulate (see Price [16]). This hypothesis simply imposes by fiat the low-entropy
state in the universe’s past, in accordance with everyday observation. How-
ever, in the case of completely deterministic and time reversible theories this
hypothesis means that the thermodynamic laws are recovered only for very
special initial conditions which are (moreover) highly improbable.
In the case of the GRW theory, on the other hand, Loschmidt paradox
simply does not arise. That is, the dynamics by itself does not entail that
low entropy states in the past are just as improbable as low entropy future
states. In this case, in order to settle the question whether or not entropy
increasing trajectories in the future direction are highly probable, one has
to actually solve the equations of motion of the GRW theory for the time in
question. And that, as repeatedly stressed by Albert, is a straightforward
empirical question (though perhaps not a tractable one in practice) about
the predictions of the theory.
That is, given the GRW jumps, the question of the thermodynamic arrow
of time becomes a completely empirical question. What is clear is that in the
GRW dynamics there is a built in mechanism in the form of the quantum
jumps that as a matter of principle can send the system onto an entropy
increasing trajectory independently of initial conditions, in a way similar
to our simulation on Section 3. And this is ensured by the fact that the
GRW dynamics is truly stochastic (or indeterministic), and a-fortiori time
irreversible.6
6 The Arrow of Time
We conclude our paper by generalizing our argument (Elitzur and Dolev
[12, 13, 14]): A real arrow of time, that is an arrow of time intrinsic to the
dynamical equations of motion, exists only in theories with indeterministic
dynamics. In this sense, we argue that indeterministic X topology dynamics,
as in the GRW theory, is a necessary (though not always sufficient) condition
6There are some extreme cases in which, as of principle, the GRW theory might not
deliver the second law. But due to decoherence effects these are probably unobservable,
see Albert [9].
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for deriving the thermodynamic arrow of time.
As is well known the postulated dynamics in most theories of current
physics is time reversible.7 This means that in principle such theories cannot
account for the thermodynamic arrow of time (and for our experience of the
arrow of time8) as intrinsic to the dynamical equations of motion. As we
briefly discussed in section 5, such theories can recover the second law of
thermodynamics only by appealing to the low-entropy past hypothesis. This
applies to both classical statistical mechanics and to no-collapse quantum
mechanics (including decoherence theories).9 In such theories no arrow of
time is built into the dynamics (since they are time reversible), and therefore
no intrinsic arrow of time can be obtained from the dynamics, no matter
what empirical evidence we have for the thermodynamic arrow. This is not
the case in stochastic theories such as the GRW theory.
Thus it is crucial to bear in mind that even if the second law of ther-
modynamics (and thus the thermodynamic arrow of time) can be derived
in completely deterministic and time reversible theories, this would mean
that the thermodynamic behavior is recovered only as an effective behavior
that crucially depends on some specific initial conditions. In this sense such
behavior will not be intrinsic to the dynamics of the theory. The microcanon-
ical distribution postulated by the traditional approaches to this problem in
classical statistical mechanics, for instance, ensures that the second law can
be derived as an effective law. But the microcanonical distribution itself does
not depend on the dynamics,10 and so thermodynamically pathological tra-
jectories are in principle possible depending solely on the initial conditions of
the system. Moreover, such trajectories turn out to be improbable, that is,
they are assigned low probability (whatever probability means in the classical
7Quantum weak interaction with CP violations notwithstanding.
8We assume here that our experience of the arrow of time supervenes on physical
processes.
9For how to recover the thermodynamic laws in no collapse quantum mechanics, see
Hemmo and Shenker [5]. It turns out, however, that environmental decoherence is a
sufficient condition for deriving the thermodynamic arrow as an effective law.
10There is a sense in which the ergodic approach in classical statistical mechanics tries
to derive the microcanonical distribution from the ergodicity of the dynamics. But it is
not clear whether this approach can be successful. See Sklar [7] for an overview of the
problem and of the ergodic approach, and for references.
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approach) only on the low-entropy past hypothesis.
Note that a theory might be genuinely stochastic and yet not deliver the
thermodynamic arrow. For to derive the latter the stochastic dynamics at
the macroscopic level must also be time irreversible, and (moreover) in the
case of quantum mechanics the stochastic jumps must result in approximate
eigenstates of position. That is, a stochastic theory in which the jumps were
to occur, say onto some eigenstates of momentum, will definitely not yield
the thermodynamic arrow. Since the above additional conditions on the
dynamics are independent of whether or not the dynamics is stochastic, it
follows that indeterminism by itself, even if it contains a built in arrow of
time, is not sufficient to derive the thermodynamic arrow. This is, in fact,
why other collapse theories such as von Neumann’s standard formulation will
not be workable for deriving the arrow of time in general.11
In the case of the GRW theory, the quantum jumps are not time re-
versible, and that very fact allows to define, what might be called a quantum
mechanical arrow of time. As we see from the above example, however, this
arrow is completely independent of the thermodynamic arrow. But in the
case of the GRW theory we saw that the dynamics alone can yields also the
thermodynamic arrow of time. In this sense, in the GRW theory the ther-
modynamic arrow correlates with the quantum mechanical arrow of time.
Moreover, if, as a matter of empirical fact, the GRW equations of motion
will turn out to yield, with high probability, entropy increasing trajectories,
then one could say that on this theory the thermodynamic arrow is derived
from the quantum mechanical arrow. That is, what we have here is a proof
that in the GRW theory the thermodynamic arrow can be built from the
specific form of the GRW jumps.
11In von Neumann’s theory the stochastic dynamics comes to play only in measurement
situations, and so the derivation will only hold for these situations. This means that on
a such a theory there will be no universal thermodynamic arrow, since no measurements
are carried out on the universe as a whole.
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